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Introduction
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an“effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in the first protocol
that we find a right to free elections. Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) reads as follows:
Right to free elections
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression
of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.
This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. It identifies 
positive obligations that might contribute to realising equal political rights in an effective
political democracy.
Positive obligations include many different measures that states are obliged to undertake
under the ECHR. The diversity of measures contemplated is impressive. The list includes
obligations to adopt an effective legal framework to protect rights, duties to investigate
allegations that certain rights have been violated, duties to take operational measures in
certain cases to protect individuals from violations of their rights, duties to provide
information about threats to individuals’ rights, duties to provide resources, duties to
provide training, and so forth.
In one sense, discussing positive obligations in relation to P1-3 is too straightforward.
This Article, unlike other Articles in the Convention, is expressly about positive obligations
on the state to do something, in this case to “hold free elections at reasonable intervals by
secret ballot” so as to “ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice
of legislature”. More importantly, the right to vote and the right to run for election cannot
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be exercised at all without state measures such as electoral laws, registration processes,
voting booths.1 At the most basic level, legislature must exist and elections be held for it.2
This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the
state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources
or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper
highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be
developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR
jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of
vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and
should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude
other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights.
The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg
institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where
the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth
sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election
and the regulation of political parties.
The journey from obscurity
For a long time P1-3 seemed to lie within a “jurisprudential black hole”3 in the Convention,
with applications regularly being dismissed as inadmissible. The early jurisprudence of the
Commission treated P1-3 as only being about the obligation to hold elections and not about
conferring subjective rights.4 Even when the Commission recognised that P1-3 required
universal suffrage (though not specified in the text of P1-3), the Commission still rejected
the idea that P1-3 conferred “the right unreservedly to every single individual to take part
in elections”.5
However, the Commission came to recognise that there were rights implicit in P1-36 and
the Court confirmed this in its first decision on P1-3 in Mathieu-Mohin v Belgium.7 Referring
to indications in other parts of the protocol, as well as the preparatory works, the ECtHR
held that P1-3 guaranteed “subjective rights of participation – ‘the right to vote’ and ‘the right
to stand for election to the legislature’”.8 In later cases, the Court refers to these as the active
and passive aspects of the P1-3 rights.9 There rights are subject to “implied limitations”.10
States have a wide margin of appreciation in limiting these rights, subject to review by
the ECtHR. The ECtHR:
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1 Lécuyer says that political rights are “consubstantial” with positive obligations: Y Lécuyer, Les droits politiques
dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (Dalloz: Paris 2009), p. 413.
2 Denmark and Others v Greece (1969) 12 Ybk 1 (The Greek case).
3 Lécuyer, Les droits politiques, n. 1 above, p. 99.
4 D J Harris, E Bates, M O’Boyle, C Warbrick and C Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights
(OUP: Oxford 2009), p. 712, n. 10.
5 X v Federal Republic of Germany (1967) 10 Ybk 336.
6 W, X, Y and Z v Belgium (1975) 2 DR 114, 30 May 1975.
7 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987) 10 EHRR 1.
8 S. 51. Although the right is limited to legislative elections and, indeed, only the popularly elected chamber in a
two-chamber system (para. 53). The concurring opinion of Judge Pinheiro Farinha added some important
qualifications as to the issue of elections for a two-chamber legislature: the majority of the members of the
legislature should be elected and the unelected chamber should not have greater powers than the elected chamber.
9 Zdanoka v Latvia (2006) 45 EHRR 17, paras 105–6.
10 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987) 10 EHRR 1, s. 52.
has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such
an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness;
that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed
are not disproportionate . . . In particular, such conditions must not thwart “the
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”.11
The ECtHR was also careful to stress the wide margin of appreciation available to states
in designing an electoral system, especially given the often competing, almost incompatible
aims of electoral systems, which have to both “reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the
people” and “promote the emergence of a sufficiently clear and coherent political will”.12
In particular, while any elections must be free, at reasonable intervals, secret and assure the
“free expression of the opinion of the people”, the protocol said nothing about whether
majoritarian or proportional systems should be used.13 The reference to “free expression of
the opinion of the people” referred primarily to freedom of expression and equality.14 The
Court concluded its general statement of principles by stressing that these principles must
be understood in a context sensitive manner and:
assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned; features
that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may accordingly be
justified in the context of another.15
While Mathieu-Mohin established that P1-3 recognised individual rights to run for
election and to vote, P1-3 case law continued to be somnolent for much of the 1980s and
1990s. No doubt this was partly due to the wide margin of appreciation reflecting the
Court’s evident awareness of the political sensitivities of interfering in matters concerning
the election of a legislature – matters which go to the heart of the question “Who
governs?” Only in the last decade has the jurisprudence become “much richer” with
judgments and indeed several important Grand Chamber judgments.16 Harris et al. note
that there have been important Grand Chamber judgments on the right of prisoners in the
UK to vote17 and on the possibility for a newly democratic state to ban persons associated
with the previous undemocratic regime from running for election.18 To this may also be
added recent cases, such as the decision on the consociational arrangements in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.19
With this rise in case law, involving sometimes very significant issues, it will be
important to consider the question of how intensely the Court should scrutinise national
situations. In other words, how narrow or wide a margin of appreciation should the Court
recognise? This may be especially important if the Court has to deal with claims involving
more than merely changing the law and involving positive obligations to resources or new
institutions or procedures.
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11 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987) 10 EHRR 1. For later citation, see Gitonas v Greece App. Nos
68/1996/687/877–9, 1 July 1997, s. 39.
12 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (1987) 10 EHRR 1, s. 54.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. In particular, the Court did not believe “that all votes must necessarily have equal weight as regards the
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15 Ibid.
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17 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2005) 42 EHRR 41.
18 Zdanoka v Latvia (2006) 45 EHRR 17.
19 Sejdic v Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009) 22 BHRC 201.
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Arguments for narrowing the margin of appreciation
While these recent cases demonstrate a greater willingness to find violations in P1-3 cases,
there are still references to a wide margin of appreciation in the case law. Harris et al.
suggest that one should not be too critical of the ECtHR case law in this area, pointing to
a speech by the Court’s President20 emphasising that the ECtHR should not be in the
business of redesigning the unique democratic structure of each state.21 This caution is
understandable, however, there are certain circumstances where the ECtHR should be more
willing to intervene and if necessary make use of positive obligations.22
First, closer scrutiny is justified to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. The
representative political process may serve the interests of the majority of the population
very well. However, there are dangers that the political process may overlook the interests
of minorities or other disadvantaged groups.23 The ECHR protects the rights of everyone
and the ECtHR should be particularly sensitive to claims that the political process
marginalises minorities and other disadvantaged groups. The ECHR Preamble rightly
stresses the importance of an “effective political democracy” in maintaining “fundamental
freedoms”. This can only work if those groups who are likely to see their freedoms
threatened are enabled to participate in the political process.
Second, apart from vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, other groups are likely to be
disfavoured in the political process: those parties and politicians that are not politically
dominant. The ECtHR should be sensitive to the fact that the rules of the political system
are drawn up and sometimes enforced by the very parties who secure victory in the political
process. This means that politicians and political parties have a vested interest in how they
design and enforce the political process.24 Where politicians design institutions and enforce
rules that maintain their own advantages, then the ECtHR should look closely to see
whether incumbent parties are abusing their power and seeking unfair political advantage.
This second type of situation is more difficult than the first. This is because there are
legitimate reasons for treating larger parties differently from smaller parties. The ECtHR
recognises that an electoral system needs to balance different objectives, including the
objective in streamlining representation so that reasonably coherent political viewpoints
emerge.25 There is a legitimate interest in recognising that one party is more popular than
others. For these reasons, the ECtHR has rejected arguments challenging the first-past-the-
post electoral system in the UK,26 or the 10 per cent threshold to obtain seats in the Turkish
parliament.27 However, these considerations cannot justify dominant political parties
controlling aspects of the political system, such as deciding who can run for election.
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20 Judge Costa, “The links between democracy and human rights under the case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights”, 5 June 2008, Helsinki.
21 Harris et al., Law of the European Convention, n. 4 above, p. 733.
22 The following arguments derive from John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
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It is legitimate for the Court to scrutinise decisions closely when they affect a vulnerable
and disadvantaged group or unfairly benefit dominant political groups. Recent Strasbourg
case law supports these principles. Tänase v Moldova concerned a Moldovan law that
prohibited candidates from having dual nationality. The law disproportionately affected
members of the opposition parties and impacted disproportionately on Moldovans of
Romanian ethnicity. The Grand Chamber found a violation of P1-3, stressing that the
Court will be very careful about examining measures that seem to disadvantage opposition
parties and minorities.28
These points, about vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and the possible abuse by
dominant parties, are closely connected to the idea of positive obligations. The danger in
each case is that an existing situation disadvantages either minorities or disfavoured political
groups. Such situations are unlikely to be rectified only by non-interference; an insistence
on non-interference (without positive obligations) might “distort” democracy.29 To rectify
any of these situations states may need to take active steps.
Having identified the background to the interpretation of P1-3 and suggested that there
are circumstances where a narrower margin of appreciation is justified, the next sections
explore some of the specific obligations under P1-3 relating to the rights to vote and stand
for election, and the regulation of political parties. The sections will identify possible further
positive obligations that may be developed, either by reference to well-recognised positive
obligations in other areas of the case law, or the principles of protecting minorities and
preventing dominant parties abusing their position.
Right to vote
This section starts by outlining the right to vote case law and highlights several positive
obligations that the Court could impose by analogy with existing positive obligations. The
section then discusses how the Court could make the right to vote more effective for
members of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.
THE RIGHT TO VOTE CASE LAW
A freely elected legislature representing the free expression of the opinion of the people
requires recognition of the right to vote. There is an implied right to vote in P1-3. For this
to be effective there must be an electoral law in place that provides an effective legal
framework for the exercise of this right. Such an electoral law would need to specify who
is entitled to vote, any requirements as to registration, any procedural requirements as to
how the vote should be exercised, and how the secrecy of the ballot should be protected.
The Court has already dealt with situations where someone has been denied a right to
vote due to an express legislative prohibition. Whilst the Commission and Court have been
generally accepting of “traditional” prohibitions or regulations based on age, residence, or
citizenship, more recently the Court has subjected a blanket ban on prisoners in the UK
from voting to a searching proportionality inquiry.30 As these cases involve legislative
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exclusions from a general law, it is easy to apply a proportionality test to assess whether the
exclusion is justified.
The Court has confirmed the Hirst approach in Alajo Kiss v Hungary, where the
Hungarian Constitution disenfranchised adult persons who were under the guardianship of
another due to reasons of their mental capacity.31 The ECtHR held that where a legislative
provision disenfranchises “a particularly vulnerable group in society”, then the margin of
appreciation must be considered to be narrower and the state must offer very weighty
reasons for its decisions.32 As in Hirst, the automatic nature of the disenfranchisement
violated the Convention.
Both Hirst and Alajo Kiss concerned the state’s negative obligations. The situation was
more complicated in Aziz v Cyprus, where legislation permitted the applicant to vote but, in
practice, he could not.33 As a Turkish Cypriot, he was only entitled to register on a list of
Turkish Cypriot voters and to vote for a Turkish Communal chamber, but these had not
existed since 1963. Consequently, he could not vote at all. This complete exclusion from the
franchise was a violation of P1-3. This meant that a failure to legislate to address the
situation led to the violation.
The Strasbourg institutions have, until recently, regularly rejected arguments that states
should take legislative and administrative steps to extend the right to vote to citizens living
abroad.34 According to the Commission, a residence requirement was justified because of
the need to ensure voters had a connection with the country, the difficulty in candidates
presenting their manifesto abroad, the lack of influence of non-resident citizens and, finally,
the close connection between residence and being affected by the laws of a legislature.35
The ECtHR has generally confirmed this reasoning,36 though a recent judgment suggests
circumstances when it will uphold right of citizens resident abroad to vote. In Sitaropoulos v
Greece, the Court affirmed the general principle that P1-3 does not require that citizens
abroad be allowed to vote.37 However, in that case, the Greek Constitution provided that
the legislature could adopt legislation providing for the right of citizens resident abroad to
vote. This was due to a provision that was adopted in 1975. The ECtHR identified three
relevant considerations. First, the Court explained that such a provision could not be
allowed to lapse in to desuetude.38 Second, the ECtHR suggested that there was a growing
consensus on the need to provide for the right to vote of nationals resident abroad.39
Finally, the Court noted that a narrower margin of appreciation applied in the right to vote
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32 Ibid. para. 41.
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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. paras 44–5.
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cases than in the right to run for election cases.40 Due to the combined force of these
reasons, the failure to adopt legislation giving effect to the constitutional provision was a
violation of the Convention.41
This case is not yet final. It is troubling since the Greek Constitution did not explicitly
require that nationals resident abroad be allowed to vote. Considering the inverse case –
non-nationals resident in a state – the Court has not found any obligation to allow them to
vote, but arguably there is a stronger case for insisting that such non-nationals be allowed
to vote in the country where they reside.42
Sitaropoulos demonstrates that the Court is willing to recognise positive obligations (in
this case to adopt a law) in P1-3 cases. There are other positive obligations that the ECtHR
could develop relating to the right to vote, often drawing on some of the obligations well
established in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. These are the obligations to protect, to
provide information and to investigate.
The positive obligation or duty to protect is relevant. Voters might be subject to threats,
intimidation, bribery and other forms of undue pressure. The electoral law should provide
sanctions to deter these sorts of activity, and there may be an Osman-type duty to take
operational measures to protect persons from interference with their voting rights.43
One could envisage positive obligations to provide information in relation to
elections.44 One might imagine at least three ways in which such a duty would operate. First,
there might be a duty to provide information about the electoral system generally. Second,
there might be a duty to provide information about the formalities and practicalities
required to vote in any particular election. Third, there might be a duty to provide
information about the different candidates, parties and positions involved in any election.
Fourth, the state needs to publish full results of the election.
Finally, there are circumstances when a positive obligation to investigate may come into
play. The duty to investigate cases has mainly concerned alleged violations of the non-
derogable rights in Articles 2, 3 and 4. However, duties to investigate have started to appear
in relation to other rights, for example, duties to investigate allegations of racial bias in jury
deliberations45 and duties to investigate allegations of discriminatory motivations in
criminal cases (this is usually in connection with Article 2 or Article 3).46 This leaves open
the argument that there may be a duty to investigate allegations of systematic denial of the
right to vote.47
These duties to protect, provide information and to investigate may be especially
pertinent when the issue is the exclusion of members of a disadvantaged minority from the
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46 97 members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v Georgia (2007) 46 EHRR 30.
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269
electoral process. The next sub-section looks at the right to vote for vulnerable and
disadvantaged minorities.
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE FOR VULNERABLE AND
DISADVANTAGED MINORITIES
As noted above, the Court has already condemned national rules that exclude vulnerable
minorities from the right to vote. This is welcome, but to realise the right to vote there may
be a need to recognise positive obligations. Most notably, there are cases where individuals
may not be able to comply with the procedural requirements involved in exercising the right
to vote. These may include people with disabilities who cannot access a polling booth;
people with literacy problems who may not be able to read a ballot paper; prisoners and
other persons in places of detention; or people who live in remote localities and who may
not be able to access a polling booth. So far, the Court has not considered many of these
types of cases. And the one case raising such facts was dealt with unsatisfactorily.
This case was Molka v Poland.48 The applicant, a wheelchair user, had been driven to a
polling station where he planned to vote in local and provincial elections. The station was
not wheelchair accessible and the applicant could only have voted if a stretcher could have
been provided to carry him in (which he would have refused to allow). The Court concluded
that P1-3 was not applicable as the bodies being elected did not have legislative power. The
ECtHR went on to consider whether the public authority’s failure to facilitate access
violated Article 8 rights. The Court concluded that such an argument was plausible, but had
to be assessed in the context of the wide margin of appreciation involved when resources
are being distributed. The Court thought the national authorities were better placed to
decide how to devote the relevant resources. The Court was influenced by the facts that this
was an isolated case, that the applicant could have been assisted by other persons into the
building and that Poland had adopted legislative measures providing for access, including
specifically for access to venues for national elections – this demonstrated the state was “not
oblivious to the plight of disabled voters”.
That the state is “not oblivious to” these difficulties does not set a very high standard.
While the ECtHR may have been concerned about the possibility of applicants using
Article 8 as a springboard for claims to many resources, this concern does not apply in
relation to the exercise of the right to vote. Given the importance of the right to vote, the
state should enable everyone who is entitled to vote to do so. This requires an effective legal
framework but also requires the deployment of resources.
Saying that everyone should be facilitated in voting is perhaps a very sweeping
requirement. There may be difficulties in facilitating everyone who is temporarily away from
home, or abroad, or disinclined to vote, or who gets lost on the way to vote! Furthermore,
there are genuine competing interests against facilitating everyone – there is an argument
that an election is a public event and that people should vote (if possible) on the same day
and in the same venue to emphasise the public nature of what is being done. In such cases,
the ECtHR needs to continue to bear in mind these competing interests that may justify a
wide margin of appreciation.
However, there is one situation where the ECtHR should narrow the margin of
appreciation and investigate even more anxiously. These are cases where the applicant
belongs to a group that may be systematically excluded from political participation, or at
least a group that is under-represented in the political process and faces specific challenges
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to participating in that process. Arguably, what human rights law does best is ensuring that
such marginalised groups are enabled to enjoy fully their rights on an equal footing with all.
Thanks to its Article 14 (non-discrimination) jurisprudence, the ECtHR already has the
conceptual tools to develop positive obligations for these groups. There are four (somewhat
related) conceptual tools in the Article 14 jurisprudence that can be used to further
participation for disadvantaged groups. First, the ECtHR applies a sliding scale approach to
the justification test in Article 14, recognising that certain types of distinction call for more
rigorous scrutiny than others. Second, the ECtHR has indicated that the Convention
requires special protection be offered to members of a “disadvantaged and vulnerable
minority”.49 Third, the ECtHR has now developed an indirect discrimination test. Where a
general rule disproportionately disadvantages a group, then the state must show that it is
justified.50 Further, the ECtHR is willing to recognise specific positive obligations to
achieve equality.51 A way forward would be for litigants to rely on P1-3 in combination with
Article 14’s prohibition of discrimination.
Applying these discrimination principles in right to vote cases would proceed as follows.
If it can be shown that general rules and procedures about voting have a disproportionate
impact on members of certain groups, then the burden switches to the state to justify the
rules or procedures. Where the disadvantaged group is one that suffers from systematic
discrimination and disadvantage, then the burden of justification should be a very onerous
one. Such groups would include racial and ethnic minorities, but also other disadvantaged
groups that may be disproportionately affected by voting rules and procedures, such as
people with physical or mental disabilities, people with literacy problems, persons in
hospitals or places of detention, carers, and, perhaps, the elderly and the young. Other
examples of disadvantaged groups might include prisoners and non-nationals. In such
cases, the state should show a strong justification for the rules or procedures. Failing this,
the state may need to change the rules or procedures or adopt specific positive obligations
to allow the exercise of the right to vote on equal terms. This might entail a mere change
in the law, but it could also entail deployment of resources. Positive obligations could
include education about the importance of voting,52 the use of postal voting, voting by
proxy, special polling stations in prisons and other places of detention, and ballot papers
with photographs and emblems as well as text. These are some mechanisms that would
assist in making political democracy “effective” for members of disadvantaged groups, at
least in right to vote cases. Right to run for election cases may be more complicated.
Right to run for election
As well as the right to vote, P1-3 also protects the right to run for elections, sometimes
labelled the “passive” aspect of the P1-3 right. Again, the Court has accepted limitations on
this right and has been more accepting of limitations of this aspect of the right than of the
right to vote.
One of the problems in P1-3 cases is delineating any sharp line between negative and
positive obligations. This is in line with the Strasbourg Court’s own view that it is not
possible or desirable to insist on too sharp a distinction between these types of
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obligations.53 Therefore, some of these comments on the right to run for election may be
analysed either as a question of whether there has been a lawful, legitimate and
proportionate interference with the right to run for election, or as to whether there exists
an effective legal framework for the enjoyment of P1-3 rights.
Under P1-3, states must adopt rules on the right to run for election that are stable, clear
and reasonably certain. There must be a legal basis for decisions about registering
candidates. Vague references to the “spirit of the law” do not suffice.54 The law must be
reasonably clear: if an electoral authority wishes to disqualify someone for not having
registered their details accurately, then the electoral law must make clear what details need
to be registered.55 Similarly, legislation allowing for votes at a particular station to be
discounted in certain specific cases or in “other circumstances” is too wide.56 A prohibition
on “professional clergymen” running for election is only acceptable if it is established who
falls under this description.57 The law must be reasonably certain: the Court has found, for
instance, that sudden, unexpected changes in the judicial interpretation of the electoral law
may violate the Convention.58 Finally, the law should be stable. Last-minute changes by the
legislature of the electoral law may be suspect.59
Apart from these requirements as to the existence and quality of the legal framework,
the ECtHR has identified process-related obligations. There is a very important passage on
matters of process in one of the key P1-3 decisions. In Podkolzina v Latvia, the ECtHR
stressed that the rights in the Convention had to be given a “practical and effective”
interpretation, not a “theoretical and illusory one”. The right to run for election would be
illusory if one could be deprived of it arbitrarily. Therefore, any decision to rule a candidate
ineligible must be made by “a body which can provide a minimum of guarantees of its
impartiality”; the discretion open to such a body “must be circumscribed, with sufficient
precision, by the provisions of domestic law”; finally, the procedure must be “fair and
objective” and “prevent any abuse of power”.60 Podkolzina requires that decisions about
allowing someone to run should be made by an impartial body, acting according to legal
guidance and accompanied by procedural safeguards.
The Court has developed this process further in Grosaru v Romania. The ECtHR found a
procedural violation because the bodies that could hear an electoral dispute were largely
composed of politicians belonging to parties other than the applicant’s. This was a failure to
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55 Ibid. para. 60.
56 Kovach v Ukraine App. No 39424/02, 7 February 2008, paras 58–60.
57 Seyidzade v Azerbaijan App. No 37700/05, 3 December 2009, paras 33–5.
58 Lykourezos v Greece (2008) 46 EHRR 7; Paschalidis Koutmeridis and Zaharakis v Greece App. Nos 27863/05,
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59 Tänase and Chirtoaca v Moldova App. No 7/08, 18 November 2008. Electoral legislation had been changed less
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11 June 2009.
60 Podkolzina v Latvia App. No 46726/99, 9 April 2002, para. 35. The UN Human Rights Committee has also
found that Latvia has denied people the right to run for election in procedurally dubious ways: Ignatane v Latvia
Communication No 884/1999, 25 July 2001. More broadly, the Human Rights Committee has concluded that
there must be access to an independent and impartial body to challenge decisions of electoral authorities:
Sinitsin v Belarus Communication No 1047/2002, 30 November 2006.
provide for an independent body, especially when there was no recourse to a court.61 On the
other hand, the Court rejected a challenge in the Georgian Labour Party case, where an electoral
commission had a high representation from the President’s party; however, there was no
specific evidence of wrongdoing.62 Nevertheless, Grosaru requires that there be an
independent body to hear election disputes. This procedural obligation is important as the
ECtHR has decided that election disputes do not attract the protection of Article 6 ECHR.63
Even more relevantly, this is the type of situation where a suspicion may arise that successfully
elected politicians and parties might be able to take advantage of the electoral process. As
argued above, it is in cases like this that the ECtHR should be prepared to intervene.
These obligations to create independent bodies to deal with questions about registration
and electoral disputes are important precedents. They reflect a restrained procedural
solution to problems before the Court. The ECtHR may sometimes64 be reluctant for good
reasons to be drawn into disputes about whether a candidate should have been allowed to
run or other electoral disputes; chief amongst these is the danger of being drawn in to the
“political thicket”. However, it is more straightforward for the ECtHR to insist that the state
should establish an independent body to make decisions on these matters. This approach
might be useful in other electoral matters. For instance, the ECtHR has not to date dealt
with questions about the drawing of electoral constituency boundaries.65 This is another
type of question where judicially manageable standards may be rare, and where there is a
danger of getting embroiled in political disputes. It is also a situation where dominant
political parties might be tempted to redraw constituency boundaries in a partisan way. A
plausible solution, suggested by these cases, would be to insist that an independent body
does any drawing of electoral boundaries.
MINORITY GROUPS AND WOMEN
Cases like Podkolzina and Grosaru indicate that the ECtHR is aware of the dangers of states
(political parties) controlling certain aspects of the political process. However, there is also
a danger that the political process may serve the interests of the majority of the population
very well, but marginalise the interests of minorities.
The approach of the Strasbourg authorities does not indicate a great sensitivity to this
problem. Rules that formally exclude minorities will be open to challenge.66 However, the
Commission and Court have not shown themselves to be suspicious of measures that fall
short of a formal exclusion. The Commission considered that as long as minority members
were entitled to vote and run for election like everyone else, then minority members could
not complain of a violation of P1-3 even though they “have no secured representation for
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63 Pierre-Bloch v France (1997) 26 EHRR 202; Taipe v France App. No 32258/96, 13 January 1997.
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66 Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina App. Nos 27996/06 and 34836/06, 22 December 2009 (GC).
themselves”.67 The ECtHR’s approach to this question would seem to be permissive of
state decisions; it seems neither to require nor prohibit special representation.68
The ECtHR has addressed language issues in relation to elections. It has rejected
challenges to the system of consociationalism in Belgium, where mechanisms are designed
to secure equal participation of linguistic groups in the political system. Its attitude on
language questions seems likely to be permissive of state decisions in this area thanks to the
margin of appreciation. Thus, while the Court accepts the creation of special systems to
recognise linguistic communities, it does not require any special provisions for speakers of
minority languages.69 This broadly permissive attitude is apparent in Podkolzinia where the
Court accepted that it was simply a matter of political choice as to what the working
language of a legislature should be. Further, the ECtHR did not investigate the possibilities
of accommodating minority language speakers using translators or other mechanisms.
These cases do not suggest that the ECtHR will require special representation for minorities.
A special case is the representation of women. There is considerable contemporary
debate about ensuring balanced gender representation in the political process.70 This being
so, it is perhaps surprising that the issues of gender quotas, parity laws and the like have not
come up in the contentious decisions of the Court. However, the Court has handed down
an advisory opinion that suggests that rather than requiring positive action to secure equal
gender representation, the Court may be somewhat wary of the idea. The opinion
concerned the process by which the ECtHR judges themselves are selected.71 The
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) elects ECtHR judges on the
basis of lists put forward by each state party to the ECtHR. Each state can put forward a
list with three names on it; the list may include persons not of the nominating state’s
nationality. In 2004 and 2005, PACE decided that it would only consider lists that included
at least one woman, in an effort to redress the gender imbalance on the Court. The
Committee of Ministers asked the Court for an Advisory Opinion on this. The Court ruled
that the policy was incompatible with the Convention. It accepted that PACE could try to
address gender imbalance and that much of the policy was acceptable. Where the policy
went astray was in being an absolute rule. It did not make any exception for small countries
where the number of qualified female legal professionals is extremely small. The Court did
not believe such states should be forced to nominate a non-national female candidate.
Translating this to the context of elections, one might predict that the Court will permit
policies to promote greater gender equality, provided there is some possibility for an
exception in special cases. This is speculation of course, and does not give any indication as
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70 See e.g. B Rodriguez Ruiz and R Rubio-Marin, “The gender of representation” (2008) 6 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 287.
71 Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates Submitted with a View to
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to what the Court might think of policies such as all-women shortlists as permitted in UK
law,72 or the parity law in France.73
From these cases, the ECtHR’s attitude to minority representation seems to be broadly
permissive. States may adopt special representation measures but there does not seem any
obligation to do so. This is a question where more judicial restraint is justified than in right
to vote cases. This is because the standards are not so clear in addressing problems of
under-representation among representatives. First, there is an argument that it is overly
essentialist to suggest that people can only be represented by candidates sharing a
characteristic with them. Even those who are sympathetic to ideas of group representation
are uneasy about this argument.74 However, the ECtHR Grand Chamber in Tänase has
already indicated that voters have a “right to be represented by MPs who reflect their
concerns and political views”, referring to voters with dual nationality.75 Second, it is
sometimes unclear whether a minority’s interests are served by having a representative who
shares a characteristic, or a number of representatives who, even if they do not share the
characteristic, will be concerned to win votes from the minority. Third, there is a wide
variety of mechanisms to facilitate minority representation, often involving questions of
institutional design.76
Finally, minority representation may be affected by the choice and design of the
electoral system: majoritarian systems, or proportional systems with high national
thresholds, may allocate a disproportionately small number of seats to minority parties.
Traditionally, the ECtHR has accorded a wide margin of appreciation in cases involving the
choice of electoral system.77 Most recently, the ECtHR upheld the 10 per cent quota for a
party to be elected to the Turkish Parliament in Yumak v Turkey.78 This high threshold (5 per
cent is more common) meant that 45 per cent of voters were left unrepresented in
parliament. While the Grand Chamber did not find a violation of P1-3, there were
indications of a less deferential approach to questions of choice and design of electoral
system. Four judges dissented, while even the majority acknowledged that the exclusion of
45 per cent of voters was “hardly consistent with the crucial role played in a representative
democracy by parliament”.79 The majority still found no violation, partly because of the
unusual circumstances in which the election took place, the overall context of elections in
Turkey, the fact that parties could find ways to circumvent the threshold rule, and, finally,
that the Turkish Constitutional Court exercised some review of the threshold rule.80
Apart from cases involving the sensitive question of choice and design of electoral
systems, there are situations where positive obligations might be appropriate to facilitate
minority representation. This is so particularly in light of the comment in Tänase that voters
have a right to be represented by candidates who share their views. In situations like
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Electoral Code, 18 November 1982.
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78 Yumak and Sadak v Turkey (2008) 48 EHRR 4 (GC).
79 Ibid. para. 140.
80 Ibid. paras 141–6.
Podkolzina, the ECtHR could consider whether the provision of simultaneous translation in
parliament, for instance, would facilitate minority representation. If the problem is that
members of an impoverished group are unable to raise a deposit to run, then there could
be a positive obligation to make an exception in such cases. If the problem is discrimination
by political parties, the ECtHR might conclude that the state should adopt laws to prohibit
such discrimination. This last point concerns the regulation of political parties and it is to
this issue we now turn.
Regulation of political parties
The ECtHR has developed a considerable body of case law on the rights of political parties,
mostly concerned with reviewing decisions to restrict the activities of a party or even to ban
them. However, there is also scope for the ECtHR to impose positive obligations on states
in relation to political parties. Indeed, the ECtHR has already recognised positive
obligations, for instance, to protect politicians and political parties when they are exercising
free assembly rights.81 The next sub-sections consider possible positive obligations in
relation to money and broadcasts, party proscription and questions of internal party
democracy and transparency.
MONEY AND BROADCASTS
A vexed question in any democracy is how to regulate the role of money in politics, in the
context of large expenditures by political parties, especially during election time. Some
national constitutional courts have developed extensive jurisprudence in this area, as, for
example, in Germany. The German Constitutional Court has held that tax exemptions for
party donations are unconstitutional and suggests that state financing of political parties,
given their constitutional role, is appropriate.82 Since then there has been considerable
litigation in Germany on the financing system.83 The German system of state funding has
been upheld in Strasbourg,84 but the ECtHR is unlikely to direct states to establish public
financing of political parties.
Nevertheless, while the ECHR may not require party financing, it is still possible for a
party to argue that a state has violated its ECHR rights by failing to extend financing to it.
The ECtHR has already considered one such case. The French National Basque Party
(PNB) was denied state funding because it received funding from a foreign entity (the
Spanish Basque National Party). The ECtHR concluded that it was justifiable to ban
donations by foreign companies, but it was not so obvious that it was justifiable to ban
donations by foreign political parties. Still, it fell within the margin of appreciation.85
Similarly, the ECtHR has rejected the suggestion that P1-3 in itself requires the allocation
of time on radio or television to a political party during an election period, unless there is
a manifest arbitrariness or discrimination.86 The UK courts have already considered such
an argument. Political parties in Westminster receive “policy development grants” (PDGs)
but only if the party’s MPs take their seats in parliament. This had the effect of denying
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PDGs to Sinn Fein, who argued this violated the ECHR.87 The Northern Irish Courts ruled
that Sinn Fein was not in an analogous position to other parties (since Sinn Fein MPs did
not sit in parliament) and so there was no discrimination. While the applicants ultimately
failed in these cases, the courts treated the claims as arguable, allowing for the finding of a
violation in a suitable case. Therefore, both the ECtHR and UK cases suggest that
discrimination-type arguments are plausible.
Similarly, as regards free electoral broadcasts, while there may not be an argument that
the state should provide for free electoral broadcasts or other electioneering opportunities,
there is a strong argument that any such benefits should be provided on a non-
discriminatory basis. If the rules on election broadcasts were discriminatory, one might
imagine an argument that a party or individual excluded from the benefits of free election
broadcasts or funded electioneering material might argue that the benefit be extended. The
ECtHR should look at the situation to ensure that any such distinction is justified. It may
be possible to justify discrimination in such cases if, for instance, the distinction is based on
differing levels of support as expressed in election outcomes. Similarly, it may be possible
to justify a distinction if a party supports violence or is fundamentally opposed to human
rights. This latter situation is the problem posed in “militant democracy” cases and the next
sub-section considers this in more detail.
PROHIBITION OF PARTIES?
One aspect of positive obligations that may be somewhat troubling is the idea that there
may be a positive obligation to prohibit certain types of party. Both Article 11(2) and
Article 17 ECHR allow for the possibility that a party or individual may be banned,88 either
as a proportionate response to a threat to one of the Article 11(2) legitimate interests, or in
extreme cases because the party or individual is aiming at the “destruction” of the rights
and freedoms in the Convention. Provided certain conditions are met, these provisions
permit a state to ban a political party.
Is there then a positive obligation to ban certain parties? Fox and Nolte floated the
suggestion that any international law right to democracy might include just such a positive
obligation, before concluding that the decision to ban a party was such a fact-sensitive and
political decision that it would be impractical to have an international law obligation of this
nature.89 More recently, Brems has emphasised Article 4 of the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which requires states to proscribe racist
organisations, a requirement which presumably includes political organisations.90
Until recently, the position of the ECHR has been the one sketched above – any
decision by a state to ban a party must be justified under Article 11(2).91 However, in the
Batasuna cases, the ECtHR seems to envisage the possibility that there may be a positive
obligation to ban certain parties.92 The cases concerned the Spanish law allowing for the
87 Sinn Fein’s Application for Judicial Review [2003] NIQB 27, 10 April 2003 and in the Court of Appeal [2004] NICA
4, 4 February 2004.
88 The Court has rejected a challenge by a Belgian politician who was banned from running for election for 10
years after he disseminated racist electioneering literature: Feret v Belgium App. No 15615/07, 16 July 2009.
89 Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte, “Intolerant democracies” (1995) 36 Harvard International Law Journal 1,
pp. 63–8.
90 E Brems, “Freedom of political association and the question of party closures” in Wojciech Sadurski (ed.),
Political Rights Under Stress in 21st Century Europe (Oxford and New York: OUP 2006), p. 131.
91 Lécuyer seems to suggest that Zdanoka, Refah Partisi and other cases may support a positive obligation to
defend democracy: Lécuyer, Les droits politiques, n. 1 above, pp. 414, 418–9.
92 Herri Batasuna v Spain App. Nos 25803/04 and 25817/04, 30 June 2009.
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proscription of a political party because of its support of political violence. The ECtHR
accepted that there was evidence of support for political violence as to make the
proscription a proportionate response. However, it also went on to indicate that such a
conclusion was in accordance with the state’s positive obligations.93 Too much should not
be read into this passage. The Court does not quite say that there is a positive obligation to
ban a political party. Nevertheless, the language leaves open the possibility to argue that the
state may have a duty to ban certain political parties.
Apart from possible cases such as Article 4 CERD where the state has accepted such an
obligation, this would seem to be a positive obligation too far. Fox and Nolte were right to
stress the fact-sensitive and political nature of such judgments. Other scholars too have
stressed the need for political actors to make very careful decisions when deciding how to
react to undemocratic political parties.94 It is difficult to see how a court – especially a
supranational court – would be in a position to make such judgments.
INTERNAL PARTY DEMOCRACY AND TRANSPARENCY
Apart from these examples of positive obligations, there are arguments supporting positive
obligations to promote internal party democracy and to support transparency regarding
party finances.
Mersel has argued for a duty to promote internal democracy within political parties. This
is necessary to support the “representative and participatory functions” of democracy and
to counteract oligarchy, among other reasons.95 While this is a novel suggestion, some
constitutions impose requirements on political parties.96 Indeed, one of the most famous
constitutional decisions in this area – the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision
to ban the Socialist Reich Party – was explicitly based on that party’s undemocratic
hierarchical ordering.97 There are even examples of this in the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court was able to apply constitutional standards to the Democratic
Party in the South to prohibit all-white party primaries.98 Given the importance the ECtHR
attaches to the protection of minorities, a positive obligation on the state to prohibit
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discrimination by political parties in terms of their membership and selection of candidacy
rules is one possible avenue for litigants to pursue.99
Finally, there may be positive obligations to ensure that the financing of political
parties is transparent. The promotion of transparency regarding the finances and property
of parties and candidates is a legitimate aim on the Convention, so states may require
parties and individual candidates to disclose information about these matters. A step
further would be to oblige the state to compel disclosure – is there Convention support
for this? An admittedly imperfect analogy may be with the environmental rights cases like
Lopez Ostra, Guerra and Oneryildiz.100 When a private enterprise is engaged in hazardous
activity and the state has knowledge of that activity, the state is under a duty to provide
information to individuals affected so they may vindicate their rights. To develop the
analogy, political parties and individuals are looking for voters to vote for them. So that the
voters might exercise their rights intelligently and so that the free (informed) opinion of
the people might be ascertained, there may be an obligation to insist on transparency about
the financing of political parties and individuals contesting elections. This is, indeed, the
conclusion to which the Venice Commission101 and the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe have come.102
Conclusion
This paper has highlighted some of the positive obligations identified by the ECtHR in
relation to P1-3. It has also discussed some possible positive obligations which may be
developed in the future. Some of these may be developed by analogy to positive obligations
already recognised in other parts of the ECtHR jurisprudence (duty to protect, investigate,
perhaps provide information). Beyond this, realising the ECHR’s vision of an “effective
political democracy” requires the Court to be attentive to the needs of minorities and non-
dominant parties. In these cases, the ECtHR should adopt a more intense scrutiny and
consider the use of positive measures.
There is a unifying theme to many of these positive obligations. Whether it comes to
ensuring that members of minority groups are registered to vote, ensuring that party
finance rules are non-discriminatory, or preventing dominant parties from unfairly abusing
a position of power, the underlying value is equality. As long ago as the Mathieu-Mohin case,
the ECtHR recognised the importance of political equality. This article has suggested some
positive measures that are necessary to realise the promise of equal political rights.
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